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🔗 URL shortener

Short links whose code is derived from the URL and anchored on-chain — so the mapping is verifiable and censorship-resistant, not a row in a database someone can edit or delete.

codefirst 7 base62 chars of sha256("bsv.cx:url:" + url)
on-chainOP_RETURN bsv.cx url1 <code> <url>

Endpoints

POST /s{ "url": "https://…" } → create + anchor
GET /:code302 redirect to the target
GET /:code/viewhuman proof page
GET /:code/infoJSON record
GET /s/:code301 → /:code (permanent legacy alias)
curl -X POST https://bsv.cx/s -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"url":"https://example.com"}'

Verify it yourself

Recompute the code from the target URL, then read the OP_RETURN in the anchor transaction — it carries bsv.cx / url1 / <code> / <url>. No trust in bsv.cx required.

And you don't have to trust an explorer for this, either. bsv.cx runs its own block-headers service, syncing the chain's headers directly over the BSV peer-to-peer network. For every anchor it recomputes the transaction's block Merkle root from an SPV proof and confirms it against those headers before publishing the proof on the record. Look for the green "✓ Independently verified against bsv.cx's own block headers" line on any proof page, open it, and recheck the same proof against any header source you trust — no explorer, and no bsv.cx, in the trust path.

← back to bsv.cx